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 Abstract 
This paper explores the decision faced by a firm to invest in an orphan drug development project. Two 
primary areas of concern are considered: financial and ethical. In order to properly understand these 
two areas, the paper first summarizes the current development landscape for non-orphan and orphan 
drugs. Once the basic development structure is established, a discussion regarding the differences in the 
Net Present Value equation for a non-orphan and orphan product may occur. Once the differences in 
the financial decision are established, the paper will discuss the ethical considerations surrounding drug 
development and drug pricing. The combination of the financial model and the ethical guidelines for 
drug pricing form the argument for an increase in social corporate responsibility in the drug 
development industry to increase treatment accessibility for patients of rare diseases.
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I. Introduction 
The private nature of medicine in the United States has created an environment in which 
companies are responsible for developing new treatments for the general public. While the health 
of a society is a public good, the development of treatment options is the responsibility of the 
private sector. In order to protect public health, the United States government regulates 
pharmaceutical developers through the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). For a company 
to sell a drug in the United States, they must obtain marketing approval from the FDA. 
Marketing approval means a company is authorized to sell and advertise the drug as treatment 
for a specific condition. If the company discovers an approved drug can treat additional 
conditions, the company undergoes another application for marketing approval for the condition. 
While the process of approval ensures only safe and effective drugs are sold in the United States, 
it raises the costs and time needed to develop a drug. As development costs increase, the 
government has implemented incentive programs for the development of drugs which may have 
low profit potential due to small patient populations. The small patient populations for these 
drugs, called orphan drugs, limit the potential revenue of the drug which discourages companies 
from researching them. To properly examine the market, Section II of this paper will detail the 
drug development process with costs and time measurements for each stage. Section III will 
detail the effect of incentives to develop orphan drugs. Once the overall framework of the orphan 
drug development process is detailed, Section IV will discuss the methods used to model the 
financial situation for both orphan and non-orphan drugs. The conclusions of the financial 
models will be discussed in Section V. Sections VI and VII will examine the ethical decisions a 
pharmaceutical company faces in development and determining the appropriate price to charge 
for a medication. This paper will examine how the government incentives the development of 
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treatments for rare diseases, financial factors influencing the business decision, and the ethics 
behind developing drugs for rare diseases. 
II. Drug Development Process 
In order to market and sell a drug to treat a disease in the United States, the company 
must obtain marketing approval for the drug from the FDA. In order to obtain approval, the drug 
must be put through a rigorous testing process of clinical trials leading to the final application. 
Before the drug begins clinical trials for marketing approval, the application for a drug must be 
established. As drug development is a risky and expensive investment, a company wants to be as 
confident as possible that the drug has a chance to treat a condition. Preclinical trials consist of 
animal testing to show the drugs basic interaction with living entities (Umscheid, Margolis, & 
Grossman, Sep. 2011). Once the drug has been shown to be reasonably safe for human 
consumption, the company submits an investigative new drug application (“IND”) to receive 
approval to begin human testing.  
The initial phase of human testing is conducted on healthy test subjects to determine the 
maximum tolerated dose (“MTD”) and the severity of side effects (Umscheid, Margolis, & 
Grossman, Sep. 2011). The purpose of these trials is to confirm the results of pre-clinical testing 
before the drug is given to individuals who are affected by the condition which it treats. Phase I 
trials simply demonstrate the drug is safe for human consumption and begin to measure adverse 
side effects. Instead of providing the drug to patients suffering for the targeted condition, the 
drug is administered to healthy individuals to observe the effects. The Phase I trial size for non-
orphan drugs is generally 65 patients per trial (Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). These trials are 
small as they simply show the general safety of a new drug. For non-orphan drugs, a company 
conducts 1.06 phase I trials on average per approved non-orphan drug. This average indicates 
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that most companies conduct one Phase I trial over the course of one to two years. Additionally, 
companies have an average cost of $38,500 per patient in the trial (Jayasundara, et al., January 
2019). On average, companies will spend around $2.5 million on their phase I clinical trial. It is 
important to note, that this number, alongside all future clinical cost numbers, is simply the direct 
costs in for conducting the clinical trial. The company will incur additional administration costs 
related to operating a business alongside the clinical costs.  
Phase II trials are the beginning of testing on patients suffering from the targeted 
condition. Once a Phase I trial has shown the drug is safe for human consumption, Phase II trials 
are used to begin measuring treatment efficiency and safety for patients. As patients for the drug 
have different health condition than the healthy test subjects of Phase I, testing the side effects 
and safety in depth is needed. A successful Phase II trial will show the drug is safe for patients to 
use and begin to demonstrate the efficacy of the treatment (Umscheid, Margolis, & Grossman, 
Sep. 2011). These trials have a larger number of participants than Phase I in order to show that 
the drug can treat the disease. On average, non-orphan drugs have 235 patients per Phase II trial 
(Jayasundara, et al., January 2019).  Similarly, to Phase I trials, an average of 1.05 Phase II trials 
are conducted per approved non-orphan drug. An average Phase II trial will take place over 2 
years and cost $40,000 per patient. This leads to a total average cost of $9.4 million dollars for a 
Phase II trial. If the adverse side effects outweigh the benefits of the treatment, or there is no 
correlation between the medicine and health improvement, the company may decide to conduct 
further Phase II testing or abandon the project.  
Once a company successfully completes Phase II trials, they may conduct Phase III trials. 
The purpose of Phase III trials is to conclusively show the treatment is safe and effective in 
treating patients. Not only do the trials need to confirm the drug is safe for patient use, Phase III 
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trials must also conclusively show the drug is effective. If the drug is the first to treat the specific 
condition, it merely needs to demonstrate it is more effective than no treatment. However, if a 
treatment option already exists for the condition, the Phase III trial must show that the new drug 
is better in some way than existing options (Umscheid, Margolis, & Grossman, Sep. 2011). On 
average, non-orphan drugs have 698 patients per Phase III trials and conduct 3.5 Phase III trials 
per approved drug (Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). An average Phase III trial lasts for just 
over two years and costs $42,000 per patient for a total average cost of $29.3 million per Phase 
III trial. As a company will likely conduct at least three Phase III trials, they may expect to pay at 
least $90 million in Phase III clinical costs.  
Once a company is satisfied with their Phase III trials results, they may submit a New 
Drug Application (“NDA”) to the FDA for marketing approval. An NDA carries a two million 
dollar application fee and takes a year for the FDA to process (Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). 
The application submits the findings of all clinical trials conducted to the FDA’s Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research and when approved the company is permitted to market and sell the 
drug (Umscheid, Margolis, & Grossman, Sep. 2011). As part of approval, the FDA may require 
the company to conduct additional Phase IV trials post-approval to expand the patient base, most 
commonly for approval to treat children (Umscheid, Margolis, & Grossman, Sep. 2011). While 
Phase IV trials cause a company to incur additional development costs and are not uncommon, as 
they occur post approval and have high cost variance, they are not included in this paper’s 
discussion of development.  
Once the company has received marketing approval, they have exclusive rights to sell the 
drug until their patent runs out, unless granted additional exclusivity. Patents provide exclusivity 
for 20 years from the patent application date. Companies generally patent their drug early in the 
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development process to prevent competitors from developing the same drug. Once their 
exclusivity expires, a competitor may submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) 
to sell a generic version of the drug. The first company to submit an ANDA receives 180 days of 
market exclusivity for generic versions. This encourages generic versions to apply as soon as 
possible at the end of a patent or market exclusivity (FDA, 2015). Once a generic competitor 
exists, a company faces competition which may significantly impact their profits due to price 
competition and lost customers. However, patients may be hesitant to switch due to name brand 
recognition and familiarity with the original product (Tenn & Wendling, May 2014). Due to this, 
it is in the company’s best financial interests to reach the market as quickly as possible to 
maximize the time of patent protection to recoup development costs. The company must balance 
the desire to reach the market quickly with the need to conduct thorough testing to ensure a 
quality product.  
At each phase of clinical trials, the trial may have inconclusive results, or find results 
which indicate the drug may be unsafe or ineffective. If results which show the drug is unsafe are 
found, the company must either alter the drug and conduct another clinical trial with the new 
version or abandon the project. The best-case scenario for a development setback is simply an 
increase in development costs, and at worst, prior investments becoming sunk costs due to 
project abandonment. The potential for failure in development is relatively high. For non-orphan 
drugs, there is only a 10.4% chance of a drug starting the clinical process making it to market 
(Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). Perhaps most telling is the only 32.4% chance of making it 
from Phase II to Phase III for non-orphan drugs (Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). Due to the 
significantly higher clinical costs of Phase III trials, companies who found mediocre success in 
Phase II may be hesitant to invest further. If the results from Phase II are weak, a company may 
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decide to abandon the project, or decide to conduct additional small-scale trials before advancing 
to large scale Phase III trials.  As a company must apply to market the drug with conclusive data 
which shows the drug is safe to use, and treats a condition efficiently, they are likely to conduct 
multiple Phase III trials to ensure adequate supporting data exists. Although the additional trials 
are expensive, failed applications will lead to delays and additional trials. These delays will 
lower the amount of time a company enjoys market exclusivity under patent protection.  
As drug development is generally undertaken by financially motivated companies, if the 
development and sale of a drug is not profitable, they are unlikely to pursue it. As rare diseases 
have significantly smaller patient populations, the development costs of a treatment will become 
harder to recoup. If a company wished to develop an orphan drug for a rare disease, they would 
either need significantly lower development costs, or higher prices to make up for a smaller 
patient population. In order to promote investment into the development of orphan drugs to treat 
rare diseases, The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (“ODA”) was created (Orphan Drug Act of 1983). 
The ODA defines a rare disease as one which “affects less than 200,000 persons in the United 
States,” or “affects more than 200,000 persons but has no expectation of sales of the drug 
recouping the development costs”. Since showing a patient population is under 200,000 
individuals is significantly easier than demonstrating a lack of financial viability, most orphan 
drug applications target the patient count of their disease to qualify for orphan status (Office of 
Orphan Products Development, 2017). Additionally, orphan drugs must treat diseases which lack 
pharmaceutical treatment options (Orphan Drug Act of 1983). 
Although they possess much smaller patient populations, research for medicine which 
addresses rare diseases is needed for public health. Although each disease has a low number of 
patients, when the approximately seven thousand diseases are combined, they account for 25 
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million patients in the United States alone (Valdez, Ouyang, & Bolen, 2016). If no drugs were 
developed for rare diseases, a significant portion of the population would face inadequate 
healthcare. Once treatment is developed for these diseases, they may increase the life expectancy 
by significant amounts (Lichtenberg, 2001). For example, in the case of cystic fibrosis, a disease 
with 26,000 patients, research which developed treatment brought the life expectancy from 6 
months in the early 20th century to 42.7 years currently (Hussain, Hussain, Malik, Patel, & 
Chittivelu, 2018). Developments of this form enable thousands of individuals who were likely to 
die as children, to finish college, find jobs, and live relatively normal adult lives. The ODA aims 
to encourage private investment in research for drugs which treat these diseases. Alongside the 
ODA, private organizations may work to raise funds for the research and awareness of a specific 
rare disease. Due to the variance across diseases, and lack of data on the results of these efforts, 
they are not included in the general discussion of pharmaceutical development.  
In order to receive Orphan drug designation, a company must file an application with the 
FDA for their drug. If the FDA decides to award the drug the orphan status, the company is 
eligible for research tax credit of 50% of development costs, grants, waivers of application fees, 
smaller clinical trials, and easier access to patients and doctors (Orphan Drug Act of 1983). 
Additionally, the ODA guarantees orphan drugs 7 years of market exclusivity in addition to 
standard patent protection upon FDA approval (Orphan Drug Act of 1983). When researching an 
orphan drug, a company is guaranteeing their product will enjoy a market without competition. 
In contrast, many non-orphan drugs are entering markets which already have at least one 
treatment option. Although the new drug must be an improvement over existing treatments, 
competition will still exist. The combination of cost breaks and market protection enable 
companies to invest in the development of orphan drugs with lower costs and risk. Ideally, this 
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will lower the price charged for the medicine as there are less costs to be recouped. However, the 
guaranteed 7 years of market exclusivity may encourage companies to gouge the price of the 
drug without the threat of competition. Additionally, once exclusivity expires, competitors may 
be unlikely to submit ANDAs as the market is much smaller than a non-orphan drug. Tenn and 
Wendling conclusively showed that generic competitors decide to enter markets based off the 
amount profit they can expect (Tenn & Wendling, May 2014). While potentially high prices for 
orphan drugs may be attractive to generic producers, the relatively small market size is likely to 
discourage investment as there are less potential revenue streams.  
III. Success and Failure of the ODA 
The ODA is unique as it is one of two U.S. polices which stimulates private investment in 
R&D through supply-side subsidization (Yin, 2008). There are two obvious measures which may 
be used to determine the success of the ODA: 1) the change in the number of clinical trials for 
orphan drugs, and 2) the change in the number of approved orphan drugs. Since the ODA has 
been implemented, there has been a 69% increase in new clinical trials for well-known rare 
disease (Yin, 2008). Yin argues that the ODA was able to increase clinical research by lowering 
the upfront development costs of R&D. Yin’s arguments are supported as the yearly requests for 
orphan drug designation continue to grow, quadrupling from 2000 to 2017 (Office of Orphan 
Products Development, 2017). While these measurements clearly indicate some form of success 
for the ODA, more complex factors which are harder measure may also be considered. Clinical 
trial numbers and approval numbers are both reported through the FDA making them easy to 
measure. However, they do not provide information regarding the efficiency of development, 
cost effectiveness, or measurements of patient accessibility to drugs after approval. While these 
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measurements are important to consider when discussing the success of the ODA, they are 
difficult to measure as they are not reported to the FDA.  
Although the ODA also increased potential revenue through market exclusivity, lowering 
the risk of initial investment appears to motivate companies to increase research.  After the 
implementation of the ODA, a significant observed difference between non-orphan drugs which 
historically have a measly 10.4% chance of making it to market, versus orphan drugs which have 
a 32.9% chance has occurred (Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). While the ODA does not have 
a specific policy which targets solely risk, the observed difference has changed companies’ 
confidence levels in investment and should be considered.  
Since the implementation of the ODA, the number of drugs which qualify for orphan 
status that received marketing approval has significantly increased. In the decade leading up to 
the ODA, under ten drugs which met the orphan requirements received marketing approval. 
Since 1983, over five hundred orphan drugs have received marketing approval. This indicates a 
significant shift in the industry; likely caused by the new incentives (Office of Orphan Products 
Development, 2017). Perhaps the most telling observable cost savers in action, are in the average 
trial size, and number of trials per phase per drug. Although orphan drugs on average have more 
Phase II trials, 2.56 versus the 1.05 of non-orphan drugs, they have significantly fewer Phase III 
trials, 1.93 versus 3.5 (Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). Due to Phase III trials significant size 
and duration, the tradeoff of additional Phase II for fewer Phase III is an attractive proposition. 
Additionally, both Phase II and III have smaller patient populations on average for orphan drugs.  
However, they cost roughly two and a half times more per patient, and each trial lasts a year 
longer on average (Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). Although the additional clinical costs due 
to trial duration are accounted for in the per patient cost, longer trials will still lead to additional 
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non-clinical trial costs, such as administration, and overhead, before revenue occurs. While 
developing a new pharmaceutical of any form remains expensive, the improved chance of an 
orphan drug successfully making it to market, increases the attractiveness of investing as the 
company is less likely to face unexpected development costs, delays in obtaining marketing 
approval, or project abandonment. 
IV. Methodology of Financial Modeling 
When a company either discovers or can purchase the rights to a new drug, they must 
decide if the drug will be worth the investment. A company must determine if they believe the 
investment will be profitable before they begin clinical trials. In order to accomplish this, the 
company must evaluate all future cash flows discounted over time to determine the potential 
profitability. The primary method used is the Net Present Value (“NPV”) equation. The initial 
equation used is as follows: 
  𝑁𝑃𝑉 =∑
𝑅𝑡
(1+𝑖)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=0
 
Where: 
R=net cash flows during a single period t 
i=discount rate 
t=number of time periods 
 By summing the current value of each year of cash flows, the company can determine if 
the project is likely profitable. This equation may be applied effectively across multiple 
industries and provides a snapshot of an investment’s value at a specific time through the 
calculation of the current value of future cash flows. For the purpose of drug development, the 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORPHAN DRUGS  11 
 
equation informs a company if the future potential revenues outweigh the immediate 
development costs. When using an NPV model, the key decisions which must be made are 
determining the discount rate and predicting future cash flows. The discount rate should reflect 
the expected return on investment for shareholders financing the project. In general, an 11% 
discount rate reflects a modest return on investment. An NPV model using an 11% discount rate 
will be used as a starting point for this paper.  
 While an 11% discount rate may accurately reflect an acceptable return for most 
industries, drug development has a high element of risk with non-orphan drugs having a 10.4% 
success rate (Jayasundara, et al., January 2019). As risk of investment increases, investors may 
require a higher expected return. Across a survey of industry professionals, it was found that a 
significantly higher discount rate is used for drug development projects to account for the 
significant risk factor (Alacrita, 2018). The second NPV calculation this paper will use will have 
a 33% discount rate to account for the higher risk of investment in the industry.  
In addition to simply using a higher discount rate to account for risk, a slightly modified 
equation should also be considered. A risk adjusted NPV (“rNPV”) discounts each cash flow 
before multiplying them by the chance of the cash flow occurring before summing all flows. For 
a high-risk industry such as drug development, this allows the company to use a normal discount 
rate, 11% for this paper, while still considering risk. While the 33% discount rate model accounts 
for risk, it does not allow for specific adjustments per stage of development which reflect the risk 
facing the company at that point. As historical data exists reflecting the likelihood of a project 
advancing to the next development stage, specific risk rates are accessible. The following 
equation results from including risk: 
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  𝑟𝑁𝑃𝑉 =∑ 𝑟(
𝑅𝑡
(1+𝑖)𝑡
)
𝑛
𝑡=0
 
Where: 
R=net cash flows during a single period t 
i=discount rate 
t=number of time periods 
r=percent chance of the discounted cash flow occurring 
A model using an 11% discount rate before adjusting for risk will be used to provide a 
third measurement which accounts for risk specific to the project. As non-orphan and orphan 
drugs face significantly different success rates, a risk adjusted model will provide a better 
evaluation of value which accounts for risk specific to each project.  
 This paper will compare a risk adjusted 11% NPV model to standard 11% discount rate 
and 33% discount rate models to provide a complete overview of the NPV models between 
orphan and non-orphan drugs. A comparison of the three models will provide a well-rounded 
picture of the financial situation which must be evaluated. To adjust for risk, the probability of 
advancing to the next clinical trial stage from Jayasundara, et al. will be used. The cash flows for 
each year are based on the research of Jayasundara, et al. alongside market research for a 
potential small molecule drug with treatment indications for a non-orphan disease, congestive 
heart failure (“CHF”), and an orphan disease, Duchene muscle dystrophy (“DMD”). Although 
the end development product may have different dosage sizes, the same molecular entity would 
be used. By choosing specific drugs, determining potential revenue streams which are based on 
patient populations is possible. For congestive heart failure, a disease which has existing 
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treatment options, the model assumes a new treatment would only be able to capture an 8% share 
(AstraZeneca, 2017) of the roughly 5.7 million patient market with a medication which costs 
patients $5,000 yearly (Center for Disease Control). For Duchene Muscle Dystrophy, the model 
assumes the company will be able to capture 60% of the 5,700 patients with a medication which 
costs patients $500,000 yearly (Center for Disease Control). The two models are clearly 
substantially different in how they determine potential revenue streams. However, CHF already 
has existing treatments with generic versions which breed competition and drive down price. 
Additionally, the presence of competitors prevents the potential drug from capturing as large of a 
market share. For DMD, if the company is the first to reach the market, they will enjoy market 
exclusivity allowing them to capture a large share of the market. The price charged for the drug 
is substantially higher but is the average between the two announced prices for products 
currently seeking approval for the condition (Grover, 2019) (Silverman, 2016). Due to the 
significant variance in both revenue and cost structures, the NPV models will allow for a simpler 
comparison of potential value to the company.  
Additionally, the model assumes that each phase of clinical trials is successful. If a 
company were to have negative results from a clinical trial, the model would no longer be 
accurate due to additional costs and delays. While these delays would alter the model, adjusting 
the NPV to account for risk ensures the value returned by the model is adjusted for the potential 
failure. While the discount rate and risk functions adjust future cash flows to account for 
potential failures, additional research to compare the effect of failure across the two models to 
investigate if orphan drug development projects enjoy a more forgiving development process 
where failure has a smaller cost. 
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V. NPV Comparison 
The below graphs summarize the comparisons of NPV for CHF and DMD.  
 While NPV is used to evaluate the value of a project at a single point in time, graphing 
the NPV as the project continues enables a more complete understanding of the project. While 
the values at the beginning of the project may be compared, understanding how the value of the 
project is likely to progress will enable better comparisons. Additionally, it allows for discussion 
of the differences in value at different clinical stages and post market approval. In practical 
-$1,000,000
$0
$1,000,000
$2,000,000
$3,000,000
$4,000,000
$5,000,000
$6,000,000
$7,000,000
$8,000,000
201820192020202120222023202420252026202720282029203020312032203320342035203620372038
NPV DMD Drugs
rnpv
11% npv
33% npv
-$1,000,000
$0
$1,000,000
$2,000,000
$3,000,000
$4,000,000
$5,000,000
$6,000,000
$7,000,000
$8,000,000
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038
NPV CHF Drugs
rNPV
11%
33%
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORPHAN DRUGS  15 
 
application, understanding the future changes in value is important to make an informed 
decision. As discussed later, two of the models for CHF experience a dip in NPV in the first few 
years of the project. If a company had not examined the value moving forward, they would not 
be aware of this loss in value. In order to make a fully informed decision, the value moving 
forward is important in setting expectations.  
As rNPV is calculated with a discount rate of 11%, once the drug reaches the market all 
revenue is assumed to occur, so the risk no longer decreases cash streams and the value becomes 
equal to the 11% NPV model. Similarities between CHF and DMD quickly become clear. The 
general trend of each line is the same. All six lines peak around the year 2030 with a steeper 
slope leading up to peak revenue. The NPV decreases after this point as cash streams after the 
patent protection expires are not included due to unpredictability of generic actions. Although 
revenue is unlikely to completely disappear at this point, the additional variables complicate 
modeling.  
The second significant observable pattern is a decrease in NPV for 33% discount models, 
and the rNPV model of CHF in the first few years. Generally, as positive cash flows become 
closer, and therefore less discounted, the NPV would be assumed to go up. However, the high 
cost of Phase III clinical trials outweighs the potential revenue as it also becomes less 
discounted. This does not occur in the 11% discount rate model as discount rates have an 
exponential effect over time. This means the lower interest rate will have a smaller effect on 
future cash streams relative to a higher discount rate. The question then becomes, why does the 
DMD rNPV model not experience an early dip in NPV? To determine this, the variables which 
may affect the value must be considered. In this case, the discount rate, 11%, is the same as the 
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CHF model, however, the two other variables, chance for success, and total cash flow, are 
different.  
 
 The success rate per year, compared to the rNPV gives insight into why a dip occurs 
between 2019 and 2020 for CHF. In the model, this is the time which the company transitions 
between Phase I and II clinical trials. This transition substantially increases the chance of the 
high cost Phase III clinical trials happening. For DMD, the transition was not as impactful due to 
the higher success rates and lower Phase III costs.  
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 Examining the cash flows of the two models highlights a second key difference which 
affects the development process. While the CHF model has a higher peak revenue, it takes longer 
to ramp to peak revenue but enjoys a significantly higher peak revenue. The DMD model 
recognizes revenue earlier but has a lower peak revenue. Additionally, the DMD model 
rampageps to its peak revenue faster than the CHF model. The ramping occurs faster due to the 
lack of competition in the DMD space. As orphan drugs are definitionally entering a market 
without competition, they are likely to capture a significant portion of the market quickly. Mass 
market non-orphan drugs, including a medication for CHF, may be entering markets with 
treatment options already available. Even if the new medication is objectively better, the patient 
population will still experience delays in transitioning between medications leading to a slower 
growth rate. Perhaps the most important aspect of cash flows is the observation that while 
treating significantly fewer patients, 0.75% of the CHF model, the DMD model expects a peak 
revenue equal to 71.34% of the CHF models peak revenue. The difference in patient number is 
made up be a significant price differential. Sections VI. and VII. will address the ethical decision 
made to price the drug this way. If the drugs were priced the same, the DMD option would not 
be competitive with the CHF model due to significantly lower revenue. 
The final aspect to consider is the values of each calculation. Both 33% discount rate 
models begin with negative values, while the 11% models both begin with positive values. The 
rNPV model for CHF begins negative, while the DMD rNPV model begins positive. The 
increased chance of successfully reaching the market, 34% for DMD versus 10% for CHF, leads 
a higher rNPV for DMD as the future revenue streams retain more value in the discounting 
process. As development continues and future revenue becomes more likely, the CHF rNPV 
model quickly recovers to a positive value. Overall, DMD appears to be a better investment due 
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to a higher peak NPV alongside positive initial NPV values. While the financial model provides 
one aspect of the decision-making process, a core aspect, price, needs to be considered from an 
ethical point of view in order to fully understand the development decision and orphan drug 
market. 
VI. Corporate Social Responsibility in Pharmaceutical Developers 
Although a company is likely to primarily consider the financial aspect of the drug 
development decision, ethical factors should also be considered to make a complete business 
decision informed not only by money. While considering simply the financial aspect of the 
decision is perhaps standard, considering all aspects of the decision is necessary to fit within a 
goal of finding another way of doing business. Ethics in drug development is a particularly 
touchy issue as in many cases development decisions are directly impacting patients’ lives. As a 
company is pursuing a life changing medicine, consideration regarding how the decision whether 
to develop, clinical trials, and eventually the price charged, will affect patient wellbeing is 
necessary. Corporate social responsibility (“CSR”), is the practice of ensuring corporate actions 
are focused on the betterment of all stakeholders through enabling of all impacted parties to 
influence the decisions of the company, not just the shareholders and board members of the 
company. This practice will likely shift the focus of a company from profit potential, to acting in 
a way which creates the greatest value for the company, its investors, and the patients it treats.  
CSR provides a framework which enables a company’s motivation behind an investment 
decision to be mapped. The motivation may fall into three different categories; Ethical, 
Economic, or Legal (Bruyaka, et al., 2013). Orphan drugs developed for economic reasons are 
generally companies which developed a technology which “happened to be applicable to treat 
rare diseases” (Bruyaka, et al., 2013) or larger established firms which acquire a smaller 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORPHAN DRUGS  19 
 
company developing an orphan drug once the investment appears profitable due to clinical trial 
success. Legally motivated companies develop orphan drugs due to arrangements with the 
government. Solely legally motivated actions in the orphan drug space are not observed in the 
United States due to the structure of the ODA. However, some European firms have entered into 
arrangements with the government to develop certain drugs (Bruyaka, et al., 2013). Ethically 
driven decisions are more often seen in companies founded for the purpose of finding a cure for 
a specific rare disease, or companies deciding to operate at a loss to ensure a treatment option 
remains on the market for a rare disease (Bruyaka, et al., 2013). While each motivation, legal, 
ethical, and economic, could theoretically exist as the sole motivation of a company, practically, 
companies will likely balance all three in their decision-making process. However, the 
examination companies which ignore one or both sections may provide insight into the value of 
the ignored section.  
Perhaps the most dangerous position to public health a company can hold, is a company 
motivated by financial and legal incentives, while ignoring ethical motivations. On example of 
this is Bristol-Myers ownership of the drug Taxol, which treats ovarian cancer. Bristol-Myers 
acquired exclusive rights to the drug, alongside an orphan designation granting additional 
protection, from the National Cancer Institute (“NCI”) in a partnership deal aimed at increasing 
the speed at which the drug would become available. Although the NCI invested tens of millions 
of dollars to develop the drug, the profits from the sale of the drug will go to a private company. 
Additionally, if Taxol was later shown to also treat another form of cancer which brought the 
total patient base over 200,000, Bristol-Myers would retain market exclusivity under the ODA 
(Newman, 1992). This enables Bristol-Myers to enjoy significant profits with minimal risk.  
Once a drug obtains an orphan designation, it can continue to acquire additional orphan 
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designation for other rare diseases regardless of total patient population treated by the drug. 
Companies can find subsections of disease which fit under the 200,000 patient requirement, 
acquire multiple orphan designations, and benefit from the ODA incentives while having a total 
patient population of over 200,000 patients (Newman, 1992).  The second potential issue is 
companies applying for orphan designation for drugs which are financially viable without the 
benefits of the ODA. This action draws limited resources, such as grants, away from treatments 
which will not be developed without them (Yin, 2008).  
On the flipside, drugs motivated by a combination of ethical and legal factors may do 
significant good, but not sustain a business or provide returns for investors. However, in some 
cases, a larger company may be able to absorb significant costs in order to provide treatment. An 
example of this is Merck & Co.’s partnership with government organizations to donate as much 
ivermectin as needed to eradicate river blindness. The company has continued to donate 
treatments to push to eradicate the disease over the decades. Instead of attempting to profit 
through the sale of the drug, Merck decided to pursue partnerships with government agencies 
which would provide treatment to impoverished communities in Africa (The World Bank, 2014). 
This decision enabled massive progress towards the eradication of river blindness through the 
donations of Merck. While Merck could absorb the cost of donating the drug, a smaller company 
may be unable to maintain their financial position while donating their product. A well-
intentioned company may charge low prices or even give their drug away for free at the expense 
of the financial obligations. While high pharmaceutical prices and profits can become 
controversial, as discussed in the following section of this paper, ignoring the financial 
obligations of the firm is mismanagement and marginalizes the shareholders of a company.   
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A combination of ethical, legal and economic motivations for developing an orphan drug 
will lead to a company which develops orphan drugs in order to satisfy previously unmet patient 
needs by taking advantage of legislative incentives to create value for their investors (Bruyaka, et 
al., 2013). Ideally, a company would be able to perfectly balance their motivations and perfectly 
maximize value for all shareholders. Practically, a company may struggle to balance their 
financial obligations to investors, and their obligation to patients as the creators of treatment 
options.  In order to behave in a socially responsible manner, a company should follow some 
basic guidelines. As previously discussed, a company must evaluate the development costs 
alongside future revenue to accurately communicate with investors regarding potential returns. 
By providing evaluation of net yearly cash flows, the risk of each stage, and the net present value 
of the investment, the company is likely to maximize the value for shareholders through 
maximized transparency enabling informed investment decisions. For legal motivations, the 
company should ensure it uses legislative incentives to develop orphan drugs not only legally, 
but also responsibly. In order to use the ODA responsibly, companies should only apply for 
orphan designation if they would be unable to develop the drug without the incentives in order to 
match the original reasoning behind the ODA. The ODA was implemented to enable the 
development of drugs which would otherwise be neglected. To simplify applications, a strict 
patient count requirement was implemented. If a company is attempting to be socially 
responsible, the practice of slicing the drug into smaller sections to qualify for the orphan 
designation through patient count should not be undertaken. The practice of sectioning the drug 
to manipulate the orphan drug system enables a company to access resources intended for a 
specific purpose, the development of drugs which are not feasible to develop without the 
incentives, which are funded by the population of the country through taxes. The practice of 
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manipulating the system to qualify financially feasible projects for unneeded incentives to 
maximize the firms value ignores the firm’s obligation to society and the patients to responsibly 
manufacture and develop medication. If the firm wishes to acquire orphan status for drugs which 
would treat more than 200,000 patients as they need the incentives for financial feasibility, they 
should work with the FDA to acquire designation through the “affects more than 200,000 
persons but has no expectation of sales of the drug recouping the development costs” clause in 
the ODA. By operating within the intended process of the ODA, a company will recognize its 
obligation to society to responsibly use the resources offered. 
VII. Ethical Pricing Practices 
A primary concern regarding the balance between ethical and financial motivations in the 
CSR model for orphan drug developers is pricing. A company must charge enough for their drug 
to ensure the long-term financial security of the company, and to fulfill their obligations to 
investors. In the case of large firms such as Merck, financial stability may be maintained while 
donating significant amounts of drugs. Merck could have decided to sell the river blindness 
medication to the World Health Organization and other NGO’s but instead decided to donate it. 
While the expect revenue from selling the medication was small, Merck is a company committed 
to developing and providing invaluable medication on a global scale. As an nearly 100 year old 
company with over $9 billion in yearly sales at the time, the donation of one of their products to 
those in need did not significantly impact their obligation to shareholders. Merck has continued 
to thrive as a company, reporting over $4 billion in profit for 2018, while continuing to fund 
need based donations of medicine globally. While Merck is a prime example of a company 
finding a balance between social contribution and financial security, a smaller less established 
pharmaceutical firm should be wary of emulating Merck’s example.  
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If a company is considering the donation of a product to aid those in need, they must 
evaluate the impact of the donation on their obligation to shareholders. For a small or new 
pharmaceutical firm, the donation of a drug may hurt their long-term financial security and 
ignore their obligation to shareholders. Additionally, while the short-term benefits to the patients 
of donation may be high, if the company fails to stay in business, the long-term implications for 
the patients may be negative. The following example demonstrates the potential long-term 
downside of a company failing succeed long-term.   
A well-known ignoring its obligation to the patient in the orphan drug sector is that of 
Martin Shkreli and his company Turing Pharmaceuticals. Turing Pharmaceutical’s purchased the 
rights to Daraprim, a treatment for toxoplasmosis which affects some individuals with HIV, and 
immediately raised the price from $13.50 to $750 per pill. Although Daraprim was out of patent, 
it only served a patient base of around 12,000 patients which makes it very similar to orphan 
drugs and had not attracted generic competition.  Turing was able to confidently increase its 
price, as the relatively small market was not attractive to generic competitors, even though the 
drug was long out of patent protection (Carrier, Levidow, & Kesselheim, 2017). Additionally, 
Turing changed the distribution method to significantly increase the difficulty of acquiring 
samples for potential competitors (Carrier, Levidow, & Kesselheim, 2017). Carrier, Levidow, & 
Kesselheim argue that not only was this practice unethical, it also broke antitrust laws made to 
protect consumers. The actions of Turing were met with general outrage from patients, the 
general populace, and Presidential candidates. Clearly motivated by financial factors, Turing is 
an example of why ethical motivations are needed. Additionally, it reflects the need for an 
ethically motivated company to maintain its financial position to ensure continued control over 
their drug. If a company is seeking to minimize the cost to the patient, it is in the patient’s long-
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term interest for the cost to be high enough to maintain the company’s financial position. While 
low costs or donations may benefit the patient in the short-term, long-term affects should be 
primarily considered in pricing decisions.  
The need for a minimum price which an ethically motivated company should charge to 
remain in business is simple and unlikely to be met with opposition. The difficult part of ethical 
pricing is determining the maximum ethical price. A primarily ethically motivated company may 
argue that the highest ethical price is equal to the minimum price a company may charge to 
recoup development costs, cover yearly operating costs, and enable future development for long 
term security. If this fits with a company’s mission, charging a minimum price is ethical and 
socially responsible. However, many companies exist as financially motivated companies who 
develop drugs to make money. How should a financially motivated company determine what 
price to charge? From a purely financial aspect, a company should attempt to maximize its long-
term financial security and profits (Gordon, 1948). For the orphan drug market, this strategy is 
likely to lead to prices which maximize profits while ignoring the obligation a company has to its 
patients. Basic economic theory states that profit is maximized where the marginal revenue of 
producing and selling an additional unit is equal to the additional cost of selling the unit. 
However, the model assumes that the market is competitive. As demand is likely to be relatively 
inelastic, and the number of firms in the market for a specific drug is low, the basic rule does not 
adequately explain the decision. Market exclusivity, through the ODA, gives a drug developer a 
monopoly for the first seven years on the market. Additionally, since orphan drugs are by 
definition providing treatment for a condition which did not previously have a treatment option, 
the demand for the drug is likely to be inelastic due to heavy patient reliance (McGuire, Jabon, & 
Faseruk, 2014). These market conditions indicate a company can charge almost any price to 
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maximize their profits without significant risk of losing patients. Charging high prices to 
maximize profits is ethically problematic as it ignores any obligation to the patients to provide 
treatment options in a way which is accessible and valuable. High prices, particularly in the case 
of life saving medications, may force individuals to decide between massive debt, and death. If a 
company in the orphan drug sector is considering the obligation they have to a patient, they will 
necessarily need to ignore the maximum short-term profit potential and instead focus solely on 
long-term financial security. This position enables a company to consider the needs of the 
patients, while maintaining their financial position and fulfilling the responsibility to their 
shareholders. If a company takes this position, they must clearly communicate their position and 
motivations to shareholders for full transparency.  
While social responsibility may control a company’s prices, evaluating the problem of 
high prices in the case of inelastic demand from an ethical point of view is also valuable. The 
most applicable ethical system may be a form of utilitarianism. A company should seek to set a 
price which maximizes the public utility. A potential cost structure for a new drug is charging a 
price which reflects the value generated for the patients. Arguably, this will create equal value 
for the patient, while allowing a company to profit in a controlled manner. For orphan drugs, this 
structure poses a problem. As the drugs are likely to be highly impactful in patient’s lives, 
attaching a monetary value to the medicine is almost impossible. For example, Novartis, a Swiss 
pharmaceutical manufacture, recently announced the price of their life saving orphan drug, 
Zolgensma, at $2.1 million. In announcing the innovative medication, Novartis argued that the 
significant price was justifiable as it was significantly lower than the $4-$5 million the company 
deemed it was worth to patients (Thomas, 2019). If a medicine will add decades to a patient’s 
life, is it ethical for a company to charge millions of dollars? Does life have a monetary value? 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORPHAN DRUGS  26 
 
Although this approach may be useful for less extreme conditions where medicine is only 
generating a small benefit for the patient, for life changing medicines, assigning a monetary 
value to determine price becomes difficult and ignores the company’s obligation to the patient. 
When discuss the price of medication, attempts to justify price with the value generated for the 
patient fall short due to the intangible value of human life. The case of pricing lifesaving 
medication shows the downfall of utilitarian ethics as a method to price medication. The value of 
the medication is potentially priceless which may lead to a profit seeking company arguing that 
an incredibly high price is ethical. If this argument is there only price justification, they do not 
have a strong ethical argument. As this paper is focused on socially responsible corporations, 
determining a strict guideline for solely financially motivated companies is outside its scope. 
Creating an ethical argument which justifies high prices for medication is difficult as higher than 
necessary prices ignore a company’s obligation to the patient and society. This is irrelevant to a 
profit seeking company, however, if facing public critique, the company will struggle to defend 
their price model. While public critique does not determine ethics, the company may lower 
prices to improve their public image. For a company striving to be a well-rounded socially 
responsible organization, the same difficulties will arise if they try to determine the maximum 
ethical price that recognizes their obligation to the patient. 
Instead of attempting to determine the maximum price a socially responsible 
pharmaceutical company could charge, examining if a company should charge higher than the 
minimum price is a better approach. The minimum price should provide the company with the 
revenue necessary to recoup development costs, fulfill investor obligations, and enable future 
development. In the case of large companies who discover an application for an existing non-
orphan drug to treat a rare disease, the company should carefully consider how to price the drug. 
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In the case of Pfizer, they market the drug sildenafil citrate as both Viagra, to treat erectile 
disfunction, and Revatio, to treat pulmonary arterial hypertension (“PAH”). Revatio costs nearly 
6 times as much as Viagra even though they are the same drug (Simoens, 2011). Revatio, which 
treats a rare disease, serves a significantly smaller market with less competition. This allows 
Pfizer to significantly markup the price for the same compound. In order to market sildenafil 
citrate as a treatment for PAH, Pfizer needed to conduct additional clinical trials as part of an 
additional application. They may argue that the price of Revatio is higher to recoup the 
development costs. Although this stance is logical for a profit driven company, a socially 
responsible corporation may choose to include the development costs for the small market, in the 
mass market version. The practice of cross-subsidization to lower prices for smaller patient 
populations closely follows the example of Merck & Co., Inc.’s donation of medication. A 
socially responsible company should consider pricing an orphan and non-orphan version of the 
drug the same to fulfill their obligation to all patients. In order to accomplish this, the company 
will need to alter their price model to consider the two development projects under the same set 
of costs. While the financial models presented earlier in the paper reflect a decision between two 
options, socially responsible companies should consider the combination of the two programs to 
maximize the benefit created for society. The price for the mass market version will shift higher, 
however, drastic price cuts for the orphan version may be possible. Outside of the orphan drug 
discussion, companies striving for social responsibility may consider pricing model changes 
which help provide treatment to individuals who struggle to access or afford it. 
While a single company may practice cross subsidization, for significant changes to 
occur, the structure of the industry would need to change. The government may construct policy 
which enables patients who struggle to afford pharmaceutical treatments to access the 
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medications they need. While the Affordable Care Act of 2010 targeted increased access to 
treatment for everyone, a targeted policy may be implemented for pharmaceuticals. In the case of 
orphan drugs, refinement of the current legislation to ensure all patients of the condition have 
access to the drug through price controls may be needed. This refinement would fit the original 
spirit of the ODA to increase the treatment options available for those suffering from rare 
conditions. While government reform may be the ultimate driving force to ensure patients 
receive the necessary care, the discussion of large-scale policy changes would require additional 
research beyond the scope of this paper as such changes require significant study of potential 
economic impact and ramifications. 
VIII. Conclusions 
This paper has shown the financial structures which encourage companies to develop 
orphan drugs, and the ethical consideration necessary for such a company to become not only 
financially successful, but also socially responsible. If a company has discovered a drug which 
may treat a rare disease, they first must determine the viability of the drug from a financial 
aspect. If the company is unable to show the financial viability of their product, they may 
struggle to attract investors or funding to develop their product. This is also applicable to larger 
companies as they decide whether to pursue a new project. While the financial viability of a 
development project is important, the ethical decisions which a company must make are equally 
important and vital to building adequate financial models. As potential revenue is vital to 
determining the viability of a project, ensuring the projected price fulfills both financial 
obligations and obligations to the patient will enable the development project to begin and 
progress in a socially responsible manner. A socially responsible company will only price their 
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drugs as high as needed to be a financially viable project and only use legislative incentives that 
they need to develop their drug.  
Although companies may decide to act in a socially responsible manner, the privatization 
of healthcare in a capitalist market leads to profit focused decisions. If healthcare is to become 
more affordable and accessible in the United States, especially for rare diseases, a shift towards 
the publicization of healthcare is necessary. Unless a company decides to act in a socially 
responsible manner, the structures in place do not create a system which encourages socially 
responsible development of drugs which are accessible for individuals suffering from rare 
diseases. If healthcare continually shifts towards becoming a public good, corporate social 
responsibility may increase along with affordable treatment options.   
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